By This Hour Business Desk

Donald Trump has signed legislation intended to intensify US economic pressure on Russia over its war against Ukraine, while placing unusually broad tariff and sanctions choices in the hands of the president.

The measure, titled the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, could reach beyond Russia itself. As described in the available account, it permits tariffs of up to 100% on countries that buy Russian energy, including China, and on countries found to be helping Moscow work around existing restrictions. The same law gives Trump latitude to decide which countries are targeted, what tariff rate to apply and whether to waive certain sanctions provisions.

That combination makes the law both an effort to curb the financial flows supporting Russia’s war and a potentially consequential expansion of presidential discretion in trade policy. Its commercial effect will depend less on the statute’s maximum penalties than on how the White House chooses to use its powers: which conduct it identifies, which governments it names and whether it applies the most severe tariff levels available.

A law aimed at Russian energy revenue reaches beyond Russia

The reported purpose of the legislation is to constrain Russia’s capacity to finance the war by targeting oil and natural-gas revenue, alongside political and military figures and foreign networks said to support Russia’s war effort or assist sanctions evasion. It also reportedly addresses the fleet of vessels often described as shadow tankers, which has enabled crude shipments to continue despite restrictions on Russian energy exports.

Energy sits at the centre of the bill’s intended pressure campaign because the measure is designed not only to penalise Russian actors directly but also to raise the cost for overseas purchasers and intermediaries. A tariff authority that can be directed at buyers of Russian energy would alter the calculation for countries trading with Russia. A separate power directed at those that assist evasion would potentially capture a wider set of commercial and governmental relationships, although the available account does not define the standards that would be used to make such determinations.

The inclusion of China in the description of potential energy buyers is particularly significant because the statute, as reported, contemplates consequences for a major economy rather than a narrow set of Russian entities. But the text available for this report does not say that China has been designated for tariffs, that any tariff has been imposed, or that Trump has chosen a rate. The 100% figure is a ceiling in the reported legislation, not a confirmed policy outcome.

For businesses, that distinction is central. An authority to levy tariffs can affect commercial planning before it is used, but it does not by itself establish which goods, countries or transactions will face an added charge. Nor does it settle whether the administration will rely on waivers in some circumstances. The law appears to provide options, not a published implementation schedule.

Congress sent a bipartisan measure with substantial White House discretion

The House of Representatives passed the bill two days before its reported signing, by a 262-159 bipartisan vote. That tally signals support across party lines for pursuing additional pressure on Russia, but the account also describes objections from many Democrats who argued that the legislation gave Trump too much authority to resort to tariffs.

The dispute is not over whether the president has been handed choices; it is over the breadth of those choices. The reported text allows Trump to decide who could face tariffs, select the rate, and waive some sanctions provisions for particular countries. Such flexibility can permit a president to calibrate pressure, account for diplomatic considerations, or refrain from acting where other priorities intervene. It can also mean that the reach of a congressionally approved sanctions measure is left to decisions made after enactment.

That division of responsibility has practical implications. Congress has backed a framework aimed at Russia and at conduct connected to Russia’s energy trade and sanctions evasion. The executive branch, under the account available, can decide how broadly that framework will be applied. For affected governments and companies, the operative question will therefore be the administration’s subsequent determinations, rather than the bill’s most expansive possible reading.

The legislation arrives after the administration had previously been doubtful about adding sanctions on Moscow, the report said, but changed course as efforts to end the war failed to produce a settlement. The signing places those earlier doubts beside a new legal instrument that can be used to impose sanctions and tariffs, though it does not require the president to use every power it contains.

The tariff ceiling is a warning, not an announced charge

A tariff of up to 100% is the most striking element of the reported law. Yet “up to” describes a range of authority. It leaves open whether a tariff will be imposed at all in a given case, how the administration would set a rate below the maximum, and whether different countries would receive different treatment.

The available report also leaves unanswered questions about the operational boundaries of the authority. It does not provide a list of countries facing action, identify particular imports subject to tariffs, state when any tariff decision would take effect, or explain how the administration would distinguish an ordinary energy buyer from an actor it considers to be helping Russia evade sanctions. These omissions matter because the burden on trade depends on the details of enforcement.

Waiver authority adds another layer of uncertainty. A waiver can narrow a law’s immediate reach without removing the underlying threat of action. Conversely, a decision not to waive sanctions can turn a statutory power into a direct commercial and diplomatic problem. The report says Trump has sweeping discretion on whether some provisions may be waived against certain countries, but it does not identify the conditions for a waiver or whether any are under consideration.

For Russia, the intended signal is that energy revenue and the networks around it could face further pressure. For third countries, the signal is more complex: their exposure would turn on how Washington applies a law whose language, as summarised in the available reporting, permits substantial judgment by the president. The difference between a narrowly targeted policy and broad tariff action could be large, and the signing alone does not tell readers which course will follow.

Questions over implementation will shape the business impact

The legislation’s economic significance therefore lies in its potential reach as much as in any immediate step. It joins direct sanctions on Russian political and military officials, supply networks and shipping arrangements with the possibility of tariffs against external buyers or facilitators. That structure seeks to make continued dealings connected to Russian energy more costly, while preserving room for the president to vary the response.

Criticism described in the report reflects concern about that same flexibility. The available account says Democrats objected that the measure supplied excessive tariff authority, pointing to tariffs Trump had imposed on several countries despite a US Supreme Court ruling that, in their view, limited his ability to rely on the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This bill is reported as a separate legislative source of authority, but the supplied material does not detail how its provisions interact with that ruling or with other trade laws.

That legal and policy context makes it premature to treat enactment as equivalent to a settled tariff programme. The House vote and presidential signature establish the law’s reported political path. They do not answer how the administration will interpret key terms, which waivers it may issue, whether partners will receive different treatment, or whether the maximum tariff will be used.

Nor does the available information establish an immediate shift in any particular trade relationship. No implementing action, designated country, tariff rate or waiver decision was identified in the source material supplied for this article. Those decisions would determine whether the statute becomes primarily a negotiating lever, a selectively deployed sanctions tool or a broad trade measure.

The report that Trump signed the bill on September 18, 2026, and the accompanying description of its provisions, have not been independently corroborated by this publication. The account is based on a single supplied report, and readers should treat its specific claims about enactment, legislative timing and the scope of presidential authority with appropriate caution until they are confirmed through additional reliable documentation or reporting.

For further context on this subject, see Vujčić flags energy-driven uncertainty as markets price higher ECB rates.

Reporting notes

What is confirmed: The supplied report says the House passed the bill 262-159 and Trump signed it two days later.

Why this matters: The law could expose buyers of Russian energy and alleged sanctions evaders to tariffs of up to 100%, subject to presidential decisions.

What remains unclear: No specific tariff targets, rates, implementation dates or waiver decisions were identified in the supplied material. This report is based on one source and has not been independently corroborated.

Sources